Chunil Express runs intercity express-bus passenger transport nationwide as its core business, with most revenue coming from ticket sales (about ₩45.5 billion in 2025). Because this is a licensed operation with fixed routes and operators and a heavy fixed-cost burden, the transport business alone runs at an operating loss. From long ago the company has held real estate - land tied to the Seoul Express Bus Terminal in Banpo-dong, Seocho-gu, Seoul, and other sites - carried on the books at old acquisition cost, so "the money the buses earn" and "the actual value of the land" move separately. A February 2026 disclosure of a change in revenue/profit structure exceeding 30% confirmed the 2025 core-business weakness, followed by the March annual report and AGM, an April decision to increase short-term borrowings (borrowing under a low current ratio), and the May quarterly report and corporate governance report. What stands out lately is that prime Seoul terminal land carried cheaply on the books and the scarce share count of about 1.43 million shares concentrate asset value into the share price, so a high P/B reads as a reflection of hidden assets - a strength - but the core business keeps running an operating loss, and a debt ratio of 558.6% and a current ratio of 12.4% leave funding tight, so a trigger that highlights asset revaluation, disposal, or shareholder returns is also needed.

At-a-glance assessment financial health · growth · profitability · valuation

Financial healthCaution
  • Debt far exceeds equity (debt ratio 558.6%).
  • Assets that can be turned to cash within a year fall short of near-term liabilities (current ratio 12.4%).
  • The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
GrowthStagnant
  • Revenue rose 1.9% year over year, and the pace is quickening (3-year trend: rising).
  • Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) revenue was 3.5% higher than a year earlier.
ProfitabilityLoss-making
  • ROE is -58.7% (total-net basis). It is below the sector average.
  • Operating margin is -13.0%.
ValuationOvervalued
  • P/E is hard to compute here, so this is read on P/B.

Ownership & governance As of 2025-12-31

Largest shareholder Park Do-hyun 44.97% (individual)

Controlling bloc incl. related parties 85.74%

With the controlling bloc holding 86%, control is very secure but the free float is thin.

🔎 In-depth analysis

🏢Business
  • Chunil Express's core business is intercity express-bus (premium and standard) passenger transport connecting the whole country.
  • Most of its revenue comes from bus ticket sales, and its 2025 consolidated revenue was about ₩45.5 billion.
  • Domestic express buses are a licensed operation with a set number of operators and routes, so revenue cannot rise sharply, and the structure carries a heavy share of fixed costs such as labor and fuel.
  • As a result, the transport business on its own runs at an operating loss.
  • Separately, the company has long held real estate, including land around Banpo-dong in Seocho-gu, Seoul (land tied to the Seoul Express Bus Terminal) and terminals and depots across various regions.
  • The book value of this land is recorded at old acquisition cost and is carried far below actual market value.
  • In other words, this is a company where "the money earned running buses" and "the actual value of the land it holds" move separately, and the market prices the shares with more weight on the latter.
📈Price & chart
  • The latest close is ₩159,000 and market capitalization is ₩227.2 billion.
  • The price sits below the 20-day line (₩180,150) and below the 60-day line (₩203,925).
  • Trading below both the short- and medium-term moving averages, the trend is on the depressed side.
  • The RSI (a supplementary indicator that weighs upward against downward force over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 34.7, a neutral level.
  • The one-month change is -17.2%, the three-month change is -22.2%, and the position versus the 52-week high is -65.2%.
  • Relative strength against the KOSPI is 97 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns versus the index over the past year with more recent weeks weighted more heavily; higher means stronger than the market).
  • That places it in roughly the top 2% of all stocks by strength.
  • Over the past three months it lagged the index by 40.4%.
  • Chart reading is best done alongside trading volume and the dates when disclosures occur.
📊Key metrics
  • Core-business profitability and financial stability are weak.
  • The 2025 operating margin (operating profit per ₩100 of revenue) is -13.0%, the net margin -12.4%, and ROE (how much is earned in a year on equity) is -58.7%.
  • The debt ratio (debt relative to equity) is 558.6% and the current ratio (how far assets that can be turned into cash now cover debt due within a year) is 12.4%, so short-term funding capacity is tight.
  • Valuation, however, must be read by a different yardstick than for an ordinary stock.
  • The P/E (how many times a year's earnings the price is) cannot be calculated because the core business is loss-making, and the P/B (how many times book net assets the price is) is 23.71x, far above peer transport stocks (usually below 1x).
  • But that figure is not a signal that the price is expensive; rather, it means the market is separately adding on the actual market value of land carried cheaply on the books.
  • Because the accounting books conservatively record assets at old cost while the actual land is worth more, the P/B is pushed up.
  • For this company, reading a high P/B straight as "overvalued" or "a burden" would miss the point.
🚀Growth
  • Revenue has risen gently over the past five years, from about ₩29.3 billion in 2021 to about ₩45.5 billion in 2025.
  • But the 2025 revenue growth rate was +1.9%, and the cumulative Q1 2026 figure was +3.5% year on year, so the core-business growth pace itself is gentle.
  • Core profit and loss stayed negative on both operating and net lines, and in Q1 2026 the company posted an operating loss of -₩1.59 billion and a net loss of -₩1.85 billion.
  • So this stock's future is better gauged by whether the value of the land it holds is realized than by transport-revenue growth.
  • The company has, in some past years, booked large one-off gains by disposing of land and buildings - not because the core business revived, but as cases where buried asset value surfaced once.
  • Rather than forecasts of the form "this year's core profit will be X," watching when and how the latent value of the real estate is realized - through dividends or asset disposal - fits this stock's growth story better.
📰Recent news & filings
  • Recent disclosures show the typical pattern of an asset-value company.
  • A February 2026 disclosure of a change in revenue/profit structure exceeding 30% (a filing of a results change) confirmed the 2025 core-business weakness, and in March disclosures tied to the annual report, audit report, and AGM followed.
  • In April a decision to increase short-term borrowings was disclosed - borrowing under a low current ratio, a signal worth watching in fund management.
  • In May the quarterly report and corporate governance report were filed.
  • Because this company has a high controlling-shareholder stake and a small share count, governance and dividend policy carry heavy weight on the share price, so for an asset-value stock it is especially meaningful to keep watching the asset/equity items in the annual report and disclosures related to shareholder returns.
🧭Bottom line
  • This stock is one to be viewed by the value of the assets it holds, not by the transport company's earnings.
  • The strength is land carried cheaply on the books.
  • There is a clear recognition that the actual market value of the real estate it holds - land tied to the terminal in prime Seoul, among others - exceeds the accounting book value, and the scarce share count of about 1.43 million shares concentrates that value into the price.
  • It is reasonable to read the high P/B not as a weakness but as the market reflecting this hidden asset.
  • At the same time, the cautions are clear.
  • The core express-bus transport business keeps running an operating loss, and with a debt ratio of 558.6% and a current ratio of 12.4%, short-term funding capacity is tight, so the time and cost until asset value is realized can weigh on it.
  • In sum, this company is strong in phases where asset revaluation, asset disposal, or shareholder returns come to the fore, and weak in phases where the core-business loss drags on, funding pressure grows, and no trigger to unlock the real-estate value appears.
  • Rather than viewing it narrowly through core profit and loss alone, it is properly assessed only by considering the actual value of the assets it holds together with the path by which that value returns to shareholders.

🔎 Valuation vs peers Inconclusive

Compared with domestic listed land-transport (passenger/logistics) companies closest in business character; because Chunil Express's core is the value of its real-estate holdings rather than the operating business, simple P/E/P/B comparison has limits, so an asset-value view is also considered.

PeerP/EP/BROE
Hanjin0.00x0.17x-0.11%
KCTC5.54x0.37x6.69%

Peer land-transport stocks (Hanjin P/B 0.18x, KCTC 0.42x) mostly trade below net assets, whereas Chunil Express, at a P/B of 28.45x, sits at the opposite extreme. This is not because the core business is high-quality, but because of the recognition that land recorded on the books at old acquisition cost is worth far more in actual market value than the equity. So the usual judgments - "a high P/B means expensive" or "cheap on P/E" - do not apply. On core profit and loss (a loss), the P/E itself cannot be calculated (a trailing limit), and extrapolating one-off land-disposal gains from a few past years into the future would overstate earnings. In the end, fair value hinges on "the actual value of the real estate held ± liabilities" more than on core operating value, and that actual land value is hard to pin down precisely from public data. With the core business weak and asset value not gaugeable from the books, an inconclusive stance is more reasonable than a firm verdict.

₩159,000 +0.32%
Market cap $150.6M

Price history Close · MA20 · MA60

Close MA20MA60

The latest close is ₩159,000 and the market capitalization is ₩227.2 billion. The price sits below its 20-day moving average (₩180,150) and below its 60-day moving average (₩203,925). It is under both its short- and medium-term moving averages, so the trend looks subdued. The RSI (a supplementary indicator that gauges the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 34.7, a neutral level. The one-month change is -17.2%, the three-month change is -22.2%, and the position relative to the 52-week high is -65.2%. Relative strength versus the KOSPI is 97 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market). It is stronger than roughly 98% of all stocks. Over the past three months it lagged the index by 40.4%. Chart interpretation is best done alongside trading volume and the dates on which disclosures occur.

Relative performance stock vs index · start = 100

97Relative strength vs KOSPI1–99 · last 12 months’ return vs the index, recency-weighted · higher = stronger than the marketTop 2% strength

Excess return vs index · 3M -40.44% / 6M -68.52% / 12M +55.85%

StockKOSPI

Key metrics vs whole-market median

Valuation

P/E (trailing)
P/B23.71x
P/S5.02x
EPS₩-3,935
BPS (book value/share)₩6,705
Dividend yield
DPS

A net loss makes the P/E an unreliable valuation gauge. The P/B of 23.71x is above the whole-market median (1.15x).

Enterprise value (EV)

Net debt$11.1M
EV (enterprise value)$170.3M
EV/Sales5.64x
FCF (free cash flow)-$2.4M
FCF yield-1.51%

EV = market cap + net debt. It reflects cash and debt, so it captures the real cost of the whole business that market cap alone misses; lower multiples are cheaper relative to earnings or sales.

Profitability & financials

ROE-58.68%
Operating margin-13.04%
Net margin-12.35%
Debt ratio558.61%
Payout ratio

Return on equity (ROE) is -58.7%, below the whole-market average (5.0%). The operating margin is -13.0%. The debt ratio is 558.6%, so the financial structure is somewhat high.

Growth FY2025 · annual report (separate)

Item202320242025YoY
Revenue$29.2M$29.6M$30.2M+1.86% ↑ faster
Operating profit-$3.4M-$3.5M-$3.9M
Net profit-$3.2M-$2.8M-$3.7M
5-year20212022202320242025
Revenue$19.4M$25.0M$29.2M$29.6M$30.2M
Operating profit-$6.5M-$4.9M-$3.4M-$3.5M-$3.9M
Net profit-$376,443-$4.0M-$3.2M-$2.8M-$3.7M
Revenue CAGR4-yr avg 11.62%

Revenue rose 1.9% year over year (2023 ₩44.0 billion → 2024 ₩44.7 billion → 2025 ₩45.6 billion), and the three-year trend is 'rising'. The pace of growth also quickened from the prior year. Operating results are in the red, so a swing back to profit matters more than the growth rate here. Over the 5 years on record, revenue compound annual growth (CAGR) is 11.6%. The two-year revenue CAGR is 1.8%. In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), revenue was 3.5% higher than the same period a year earlier.

Latest quarterly results Q1 2026 · vs year-ago

Revenue$7.4M
Revenue YoY+3.48%
Operating profit-$1.1M
Op. profit YoY
Net profit-$1.2M
Net profit YoY

Technical indicators

RSI (14)34.7
MA20₩180,150
MA60₩203,925
1-month-17.19%
3-month-22.25%
vs 52-wk high-65.25%

What stands out

Points to watch

  • Debt far exceeds equity (debt ratio 558.6%).
  • Assets that can be turned to cash within a year fall short of near-term liabilities (current ratio 12.4%).
  • The most recent full year was a loss, so it is worth checking whether profitability recovers.
  • The price is high versus peers, so expectations already appear priced in.

Recent news & events searched · sourced

Figure cross-check computed ↔ external

MetricComputedExternalStatusSource
2025 operating loss-₩5.9 billion(operating margin -13.0%)revenue· 30%Unverifiedlink
P/B (price-to-book ratio)28.45x0.18x·KCTC 0.42xUnverifiedlink
Q1 2026 net loss-₩1.9 billion(2026.03)Unverifiedlink

Recent filings

📖 Plain-language glossary — expand if you are new to this
P/E
How many times a year's net profit the price is worth (lower is cheaper relative to earnings). The P/E here is on trailing (last full-year) results; for companies whose earnings swing fast (memory chips and other cyclicals/high-growth), a forward P/E on this year's expected earnings is more accurate.
P/B
Price relative to net assets (equity). Around 1x means it trades near book value; below 1x means below book.
P/S
Price relative to a year's revenue — useful for growth companies with thin earnings.
Net debt / EV
Net debt = interest-bearing debt − cash. Negative means more cash than debt (net cash). EV (enterprise value) = market cap + net debt, closer to what it would cost to buy the whole business.
EV/EBIT · EV/EBITDA · EV/Sales
Enterprise value against operating profit (EBIT), EBITDA, or revenue. Unlike P/E these reflect debt and cash; lower is cheaper relative to earnings power or sales.
FCF / FCF yield
Free cash flow = operating cash − capex, the cash actually left over. FCF yield = FCF ÷ market cap; higher means more cash generated per unit of market value.
Intrinsic value (DCF)
Future free cash flow (or, for some capex-heavy but profitable names, forecast earnings) discounted to today to estimate per-share value. Because it shifts a lot with the discount-rate and growth assumptions, it is shown as a bear/base/bull range, and the basis and assumptions are disclosed in one line beneath it.
ROE
How much profit the company earns in a year on its equity (%). Higher means better returns on capital.
EPS / BPS
Earnings per share / net assets (book value) per share.
Operating / net margin
Profit left from the core business / final profit after tax and interest, per unit of revenue.
Debt ratio
Debt relative to equity (%). Higher means more reliance on borrowing (norms vary by sector).
Current ratio
Assets convertible to cash within a year against debt due within a year. Above 100% leaves some short-term headroom.
Interest coverage
How many times operating profit covers the interest owed. Below 1x means operating profit alone struggles to cover interest.
Dividend yield / payout ratio
The year's dividend as a % of today's price / the share of earnings paid out as dividends.
Revenue CAGR
Multi-year growth expressed as a single yearly average (compound annual growth rate).
RSI (short-term signal)
Whether recent price action is overheated or beaten down. Above 70 is overbought, below 30 oversold.
MA20 / MA60 (moving averages)
The 20- and 60-day average price. Price above them signals a firmer short-term trend.
vs 52-week high
How far below the past year's peak the price sits now (%).

All figures are for reference only; how they read varies by sector and over time.

Sources: Korea FSC market-price API (data.go.kr), OpenDART, KRX/KIND — public data only.

Bong Stocks presents public-data-based information for reference only. It is not investment advice and contains no target prices, ratings, or buy/sell recommendations. Verify independently before making any decision.