Philoptics makes precision machining equipment that uses lasers to cut and drill thin materials. Its business runs along three lines: display equipment for OLED panels in smartphones and tablets; battery (secondary-cell) equipment, through its subsidiary Phill Energy, for stacking and notching; and glass-substrate equipment for semiconductors, such as TGV and singulation tools. Revenue follows an order-based structure driven by customers' capital-expenditure cycles. A May 22, 2026 disclosure on a subsidiary's new facility investment confirmed that a ₩23.0 billion program (11.9% of equity) has been under way from February 2024 through the end of 2026, and the May 14 quarterly report disclosed confirmed first-quarter results. What stands out recently is that its proven display and battery equipment portfolio, its foothold in the next-generation glass-substrate field, and its continued facility investment even through a lossmaking phase are strengths, while its revenue can drop sharply with customers' capex cycles, its debt ratio is a high 329.7%, and commercialization of glass substrates will take time, so the timing of a recovery must be watched.

At-a-glance assessment financial health · growth · profitability · valuation

Financial healthCaution
  • Debt far exceeds equity (debt ratio 329.7%).
  • The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
GrowthDeclining
  • Revenue fell 74.8% year over year (3-year trend: mixed).
  • Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) revenue was 66.4% lower than a year earlier.
ProfitabilityLoss-making
  • ROE is -14.6% (controlling-interest basis). It is below the sector average.
  • Operating margin is -33.7%.
ValuationOvervalued
  • P/E is hard to compute here, so this is read on P/B.

Ownership & governance As of 2025-12-31

Largest shareholder Han Ki-su 25% (individual)

Controlling bloc incl. related parties 25.87%

With the controlling bloc holding 26%, control is maintained but the free float is relatively large.

🔎 In-depth analysis

🏢Business
  • Philoptics makes and sells precision machining equipment that uses lasers to cut, drill, and etch thin materials.
  • Its revenue comes from three main lines.
  • First is display equipment.
  • Its mainstays are laser cutting (dividing a mother panel into product-sized pieces), exposure, and inspection tools used to make OLED panels for smartphones and tablets, with panel makers such as Samsung Display as key customers.
  • Second is battery equipment.
  • It makes assembly-process tools that stack and notch battery cells, a business carried on through its physically spun-off subsidiary Phill Energy (378340).
  • Third, and recently prominent, is glass substrates, a next-generation technology that replaces the conventional plastic material used to package semiconductors with glass.
  • The company is leading with TGV tools that drill fine holes in glass and singulation (cutting) tools.
  • In short, the root of revenue is the customers' facility-investment cycle: orders cluster when customers add lines and revenue falls off when they cut back, an order-based structure.
📈Price & chart
  • The latest close is ₩28,850 and the market cap is ₩676.3 billion.
  • The price sits below the 20-day line (₩37,085) and the 60-day line (₩44,148).
  • Trading below both the short- and medium-term moving averages, the trend looks subdued.
  • The RSI (a gauge that compares upward and downward strength over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 31.0, a neutral level.
  • The one-month change is -24.8% and the three-month change is -20.7%, and the price is -54.2% from its 52-week high.
  • Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 58 (on a 1-99 scale, converting the past year's return versus the index with more weight on recent periods; higher means stronger than the market), placing it in roughly the top 42% of all stocks by strength.
  • Over the past three months it lagged the index by 0.8%.
  • Chart readings are best viewed together with trading volume and the dates of disclosures.
📊Key metrics
  • On confirmed 2025 results, the net profit was a loss, so the P/E ratio (how many times one year's profit the price represents) is not calculable.
  • Instead, the P/B (how many times equity the price represents) is a high 5.81x, and the P/S (how many times one year's revenue the price represents) is 7.52x.
  • Because revenue fell sharply, the valuation relative to revenue looks especially expensive.
  • Profitability is poor.
  • ROE (how much is earned in a year on equity) is -14.6% and the operating margin is -33.7%, a lossmaking range.
  • The debt ratio (debt relative to equity) is a high 329.7%.
  • That said, the current ratio is 118.6%, meaning it holds more assets that can be turned to cash within a year than debt due within a year, so short-term solvency itself is intact.
  • The cash situation is also better than it looks.
  • Net debt (total borrowings minus cash) is about negative ₩23.5 billion, a net-cash position with more cash than debt.
  • The FCF yield (cash actually earned relative to market cap) is -0.6%, indicating it is still in a phase of spending rather than earning cash.
  • The important point is that these figures are a snapshot of a 'year with empty order books.' In a lean-order year, an equipment company's revenue falls and it looks lossmaking with a high P/B; in a full-order year the figures recover quickly.
  • Rather than judging on a single year's metrics, one must view them alongside the order flow to see the real underlying strength.
🚀Growth
  • Five-year revenue was ₩230.8 billion in 2021, ₩304.0 billion in 2022, ₩300.0 billion in 2023, ₩410.9 billion in 2024, and ₩103.4 billion in 2025.
  • After peaking in 2024, revenue plunged to about a quarter of that in 2025 (-74.8% year over year).
  • Operating profit also swung from a ₩13.8 billion profit in 2024 to a ₩34.9 billion loss in 2025.
  • The weakness continued into the first quarter of 2026, with revenue of ₩11.0 billion (-66.4% year over year), an operating loss of ₩5.4 billion, and a net loss of ₩12.5 billion.
  • The cause of this swing is clear: revenue is tied entirely to customers' facility-investment cycles.
  • In particular, the pullback in demand for battery equipment, which had been a large share of revenue, weighed heavily.
  • When customers stop adding lines, the order gap shows up quickly as a plunge in revenue and losses.
  • The company's official numeric annual outlook has not been confirmed, so it is hard to pin this year's earnings to a figure.
  • Still, the direction of a recovery is clear.
  • If orders for existing display and battery lines revive, or if revenue is booked in newly entered areas such as glass substrates, the same order-based structure would this time work to the upside.
  • The current figures look close to a cycle bottom.
  • The next recovery depends on how quickly the order backlog fills.
📰Recent news & filings
  • The thread of recent disclosures is 'preparing for the next stage of growth.' The May 22, 2026 disclosure on a subsidiary's new facility investment confirms that a ₩23.0 billion program (11.9% of equity) has been under way from February 2024 through the end of 2026, in the nature of expanding staff and production capacity and read as preparation for display and new-business lines.
  • On May 11 it gave notice of an investor briefing (IR) to be held at the Korea Exchange on May 19.
  • The May 14 quarterly report disclosed confirmed first-quarter results.
  • Even through a lossmaking phase, the company has not stopped investing or communicating.
  • The most important point to watch is when this investment comes back as actual orders, revenue, and cash flow.
🧭Bottom line
  • This company is clearly in a cycle-bottom phase.
  • Consider the strengths first.
  • It has a proven equipment portfolio in displays and batteries.
  • It also has a foothold in the next-generation glass-substrate field.
  • Even through a lossmaking phase, it is continuing a facility investment in the ₩20-billion-plus range to prepare for the next cycle.
  • That the current price is set high relative to asset value is also a result of the market pricing in new-business expectations in advance; a loss alone is not necessarily a reason to see it as risk.
  • At the same time, the cautions are clear.
  • Revenue is governed by customers' facility-investment cycles and can plunge within a year, as it did in 2025.
  • The high debt ratio of 329.7% means the burden grows if the order gap runs long.
  • Full commercialization of glass substrates is still a task for the future, so it will take time to contribute to results.
  • In short, in a phase where new orders (especially glass substrates and batteries) are confirmed in results and the cycle turns up, the pre-priced expectations are justified and it is strong.
  • Conversely, in a phase where the order recovery is delayed, the high valuation and debt work as weaknesses.
  • This is a stock whose recovery timing must be watched together.

🔎 Valuation vs peers Overvalued

Peers were set on the business substance of laser machining equipment. EO Technics (laser semiconductor equipment), AP Systems (display laser equipment), and Wonik IPS (semiconductor equipment) are viewed together.

PeerP/EP/BROE
EO Technics73.75x6.13x8.32%
AP Systems12.50x0.81x6.47%
Wonik IPS61.28x5.31x8.66%

It is lossmaking now, so a P/E cannot value it. Instead, on a P/B of 6.68x it is at almost the same level as profitable laser-equipment peers EO Technics (6.89x) or Wonik IPS (6.66x). Those two earn profits, while Philoptics is lossmaking. That its value relative to net assets is nonetheless similar means that not current results but glass-substrate growth expectations are holding up the price. AP Systems, also a display laser-equipment maker, is far cheaper at a P/B of 0.85x. This gap shows the size of the growth premium attached to Philoptics. 2025 was a bottom phase in which revenue shrank to a quarter, so last year's metrics alone do not fully show normalized earning power. Still, because it sustains this level on growth expectations alone without results to back them, we see the current valuation as overvalued. It is a structure where the metrics could change quickly if new orders are confirmed in forward results.

₩28,850 +1.41%
Market cap $448.2M

Price history Close · MA20 · MA60

Close MA20MA60

The latest close is ₩28,850 and the market capitalization is ₩676.3 billion. The price sits below its 20-day moving average (₩37,085) and below its 60-day moving average (₩44,148). It is under both its short- and medium-term moving averages, so the trend looks subdued. The RSI (a supplementary indicator that gauges the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 31.0, a neutral level. The one-month change is -24.8%, the three-month change is -20.7%, and the position relative to the 52-week high is -54.2%. Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 58 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market). It is stronger than roughly 58% of all stocks. Over the past three months it lagged the index by 0.8%. Chart interpretation is best done alongside trading volume and the dates on which disclosures occur.

Relative performance stock vs index · start = 100

58Relative strength vs KOSDAQ1–99 · last 12 months’ return vs the index, recency-weighted · higher = stronger than the marketTop 42% strength

Excess return vs index · 3M -0.75% / 6M -26.87% / 12M -22.72%

StockKOSDAQ

Key metrics vs sector median

Valuation

P/E (trailing)
P/B5.81x
P/S6.54x
EPS₩-726
BPS (book value/share)₩4,962
Dividend yield
DPS

A net loss makes the P/E an unreliable valuation gauge. The P/B of 5.81x is above the sector median (1.44x).

Enterprise value (EV)

Net debt-$15.6M
EV (enterprise value)$499.5M
EV/Sales7.29x
FCF (free cash flow)-$3.1M
FCF yield-0.61%

EV = market cap + net debt. It reflects cash and debt, so it captures the real cost of the whole business that market cap alone misses; lower multiples are cheaper relative to earnings or sales.

Profitability & financials

ROE-14.63%
Operating margin-33.73%
Net margin-16.45%
Debt ratio329.70%
Payout ratio

Return on equity (ROE) is -14.6%, below the sector average (5.0%). The operating margin is -33.7%. The debt ratio is 329.7%, so the financial structure is somewhat high.

Growth FY2025 · annual report (consolidated)

Item202320242025YoY
Revenue$198.8M$272.3M$68.6M-74.83% ↓ slower
Operating profit$6.8M$9.1M-$23.1M-352.91% ↓ slower
Net profit-$28.6M$14.2M-$11.3M-179.22%
5-year20212022202320242025
Revenue$153.0M$201.5M$198.8M$272.3M$68.6M
Operating profit-$7.0M$12.0M$6.8M$9.1M-$23.1M
Net profit-$7.6M-$3.9M-$28.6M$14.2M-$11.3M
Revenue CAGR4-yr avg -18.18%

Revenue fell 74.8% year over year (2023 ₩300.0 billion → 2024 ₩410.9 billion → 2025 ₩103.4 billion), and the three-year trend is 'mixed'. The rate of decline widened from the prior year. Operating profit fell 352.9% year over year. The decline widened. Over the 5 years on record, revenue compound annual growth (CAGR) is -18.2%. The two-year revenue CAGR is -41.3%. In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), revenue was 66.4% lower than the same period a year earlier.

Latest quarterly results Q1 2026 · vs year-ago

Revenue$7.3M
Revenue YoY-66.42%
Operating profit-$3.5M
Op. profit YoY
Net profit-$8.3M
Net profit YoY

Technical indicators

RSI (14)31.0
MA20₩37,085
MA60₩44,148
1-month-24.77%
3-month-20.74%
vs 52-wk high-54.21%

What stands out

Points to watch

  • Debt far exceeds equity (debt ratio 329.7%).
  • The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
  • The most recent full year was a loss, so it is worth checking whether profitability recovers.
  • Revenue fell 74.8% year over year (3-year trend: mixed).
  • The price is high versus peers, so expectations already appear priced in.

Recent news & events searched · sourced

Figure cross-check computed ↔ external

MetricComputedExternalStatusSource
FY2025 annual revenue₩103.4 billion₩103,440,867,014Confirmedlink
FY2025 operating profit-₩34.9 billion-₩34,892,060,535Confirmedlink
Subsidiary new facility investment amount₩23.0 billion₩23,000,000,000 / 11.9%Confirmedlink
Net debt (net-cash status)approx. -₩23.5 billionUnverifiedlink

Recent filings

📖 Plain-language glossary — expand if you are new to this
P/E
How many times a year's net profit the price is worth (lower is cheaper relative to earnings). The P/E here is on trailing (last full-year) results; for companies whose earnings swing fast (memory chips and other cyclicals/high-growth), a forward P/E on this year's expected earnings is more accurate.
P/B
Price relative to net assets (equity). Around 1x means it trades near book value; below 1x means below book.
P/S
Price relative to a year's revenue — useful for growth companies with thin earnings.
Net debt / EV
Net debt = interest-bearing debt − cash. Negative means more cash than debt (net cash). EV (enterprise value) = market cap + net debt, closer to what it would cost to buy the whole business.
EV/EBIT · EV/EBITDA · EV/Sales
Enterprise value against operating profit (EBIT), EBITDA, or revenue. Unlike P/E these reflect debt and cash; lower is cheaper relative to earnings power or sales.
FCF / FCF yield
Free cash flow = operating cash − capex, the cash actually left over. FCF yield = FCF ÷ market cap; higher means more cash generated per unit of market value.
Intrinsic value (DCF)
Future free cash flow (or, for some capex-heavy but profitable names, forecast earnings) discounted to today to estimate per-share value. Because it shifts a lot with the discount-rate and growth assumptions, it is shown as a bear/base/bull range, and the basis and assumptions are disclosed in one line beneath it.
ROE
How much profit the company earns in a year on its equity (%). Higher means better returns on capital.
EPS / BPS
Earnings per share / net assets (book value) per share.
Operating / net margin
Profit left from the core business / final profit after tax and interest, per unit of revenue.
Debt ratio
Debt relative to equity (%). Higher means more reliance on borrowing (norms vary by sector).
Current ratio
Assets convertible to cash within a year against debt due within a year. Above 100% leaves some short-term headroom.
Interest coverage
How many times operating profit covers the interest owed. Below 1x means operating profit alone struggles to cover interest.
Dividend yield / payout ratio
The year's dividend as a % of today's price / the share of earnings paid out as dividends.
Revenue CAGR
Multi-year growth expressed as a single yearly average (compound annual growth rate).
RSI (short-term signal)
Whether recent price action is overheated or beaten down. Above 70 is overbought, below 30 oversold.
MA20 / MA60 (moving averages)
The 20- and 60-day average price. Price above them signals a firmer short-term trend.
vs 52-week high
How far below the past year's peak the price sits now (%).

All figures are for reference only; how they read varies by sector and over time.

Sources: Korea FSC market-price API (data.go.kr), OpenDART, KRX/KIND — public data only.

Bong Stocks presents public-data-based information for reference only. It is not investment advice and contains no target prices, ratings, or buy/sell recommendations. Verify independently before making any decision.