Clobot does not make robots; it sells the software that lets robots find their own way — Chameleon — and CROMS, which monitors and controls many robots from a single screen. Revenue comes from software implementation and from a subscription-based (RaaS) operations service, so as service robots proliferate, the control and operations revenue grows with them. The biggest event right now is its push to acquire management control of Doosan Logistics Solution (DLS): on May 7 it resolved to submit a binding offer, and it will fund the deal with a rights offering decided in April (issuing 5,494,500 common shares), with the stated use of proceeds disclosed as roughly ₩37.66 billion of working capital and about ₩162.34 billion for acquiring another company; a lawsuit above a set threshold was also disclosed on June 8. On the positive side, revenue has grown for three straight years and reaccelerated to +65% in Q1, the operating loss is narrowing quickly, and it has a differentiated business axis in autonomous-navigation and fleet-control software. On the cautionary side, it is still operating at a loss so it needs confirmation that revenue growth is turning into profit, and it carries dilution from the large rights offering plus post-acquisition integration and litigation contingencies.
At-a-glance assessment financial health · growth · profitability · valuation
- Revenue rose 24.0% year over year, and the pace is slowing (3-year trend: rising).
- Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) revenue was 65.0% higher than a year earlier.
- Operating margin is -7.7%.
- P/E is hard to compute here, so this is read on P/B.
Ownership & governance As of 2025-12-31
Largest shareholder Kim Chang-gu 15.54% (individual)
Controlling bloc incl. related parties 16.69%
With the controlling bloc holding 17%, control is maintained but the free float is relatively large.
🔎 In-depth analysis
- Clobot is not a company that makes robots; it sells the software that lets robots find their own way and move, and that lets many robots be controlled from a single screen.
- It has two flagship products.
- 'Chameleon' is software that lets robots navigate indoors autonomously without colliding, and 'CROMS' is a system that groups robots from different manufacturers in the cloud and monitors and controls them all at once.
- Revenue comes from implementing this software to fit customer environments, and from a subscription-based approach (RaaS, Robot-as-a-Service) in which it operates robots directly and charges a usage fee.
- In other words, what earns money is the 'software and operations service,' not the price of robot hardware — a difference from the manufacturers in the same robot sector.
- Because once installed, control and operations revenue rises as the number of robots grows, the company is positioned to benefit directly from the trend of expanding service-robot adoption.
- The latest close is ₩25,150 and market capitalization is ₩640.3 billion.
- The price sits below the 20-day line (₩31,462) and below the 60-day line (₩40,758).
- Trading beneath both the short- and mid-term moving averages, the trend is on the soft side.
- The RSI (a gauge that measures the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 31.6, a neutral level.
- The one-month change is -25.4%, the three-month change is -38.4%, and the position versus the 52-week high is -66.8%.
- Relative strength against the KOSDAQ is 70 (on a 1-99 scale, computed from returns versus the index over the past year with more weight on recent periods; higher means stronger than the market).
- That places it in roughly the top 29% of all stocks by strength.
- Over the past three months it lagged the index by 22.2%.
- Chart reading is best done alongside volume and the dates on which disclosures occurred.
- On confirmed full-year (2025) figures, the P/E (how many times a year's net profit the shares trade at) cannot be computed because the company is still in a net-loss position, and ROE (how much it earns in a year on its equity) is likewise not shown for the same reason.
- The P/B (how many times book net asset value the shares trade at) is 10.61x.
- For a company with no profit yet, this number only shows how much 'expectation of future earnings' is priced in, and is not by itself a basis to call the shares expensive.
- In fact, within the same robot sector, Clobot's P/B is on the lower side than Doosan Robotics or Rainbow Robotics.
- On profitability, the operating margin is -7.7% — still a loss — but the loss itself narrowed by more than half, from ₩7.5 billion in 2024 to ₩3.2 billion in 2025.
- The debt ratio (debt relative to equity) is 121.0% and the current ratio (assets that can be turned to cash within a year against debt due within a year) is 625%, so short-term payment capacity is ample.
- In sum, its finances are at an early growth stage that is too soon to judge on profit, so rather than viewing the single P/B figure as a burden, it should be seen alongside the direction of rapidly shrinking losses and steeply rising revenue for a balanced picture.
- Revenue rose for three straight years, from ₩24.2 billion in 2023 to ₩33.4 billion in 2024 to ₩41.4 billion in 2025, with a three-year compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 30.8%.
- The more important signal is the most recent quarter.
- Q1 2026 revenue was ₩8.1 billion, up 65.0% from the same period a year earlier, so growth — which had slowed from +38% (2024) to +24% (2025) — reaccelerated.
- This reads as a sign that expanding service-robot adoption and rising demand for software and control are starting to show up as actual revenue.
- The direction on profitability is good too.
- The operating result is still a loss, but the loss narrowed quickly from ₩7.5 billion (2024) to ₩3.2 billion (2025), and the Q1 loss (₩2.5 billion) is growing lighter relative to the top line as revenue expands.
- If this trend of shrinking losses as revenue rises continues, the inflection from loss to profit becomes the key juncture.
- One thing to be clear about: the company's official annual profit outlook for this year is not confirmed in its disclosures, so no forward P/E is presented.
- This is not to talk the numbers down, but because, being at a pre-profitability stage, no reliable earnings-based multiple has yet been formed — which is all the more reason to judge on the real data of revenue growth and shrinking losses.
- The biggest event at Clobot right now is its push to acquire management control of Doosan Logistics Solution (DLS).
- On May 7 the board resolved to submit a binding offer to acquire the DLS stake from Doosan, with the aim of strengthening its logistics-robot and unified fleet-control business and securing WMS and WCS (warehouse and logistics operations software) capabilities.
- The acquisition is to be funded with the rights offering decided in April (a public offering of forfeited shares after a rights allocation, issuing 5,494,500 common shares), and the use of proceeds stated in the disclosure is roughly ₩37.66 billion of working capital and about ₩162.34 billion for acquiring securities of another company (the DLS purchase).
- This process is both a chance to expand the business and a source of dilution from new-share issuance, so it cuts both ways for existing shareholders.
- Separately, a single sales/supply contract (voluntary disclosure) on June 9 added to the revenue base, and on June 8 a lawsuit above a set threshold was disclosed, creating a contingency to watch alongside.
- The strengths are distinct.
- Revenue has grown for three straight years and reaccelerated to +65% in Q1, the loss is narrowing quickly, and rather than simple robot manufacturing it has a differentiated business axis in autonomous-navigation and fleet-control software.
- Its P/B is not high within the same robot sector either, so this is not a stock to view as 'expensive no matter what just because there is no profit.' If the DLS acquisition is completed, there is also room for the top line to expand into the larger logistics-robot market.
- The cautions are also clear.
- The company is still operating at a loss, so it needs confirmation that revenue growth turns into profit, and it carries the dilution from the large rights offering, the uncertainty of post-acquisition integration (stably combining systems, organizations, and results after merging another company), and the contingency of litigation.
- In short, this is an early-growth, transitional stock that is strong when 'revenue growth converts to profit and the DLS integration goes smoothly,' and weaker when 'the loss drags on or the offering and integration burdens overlap.'
🔎 Valuation vs peers Inconclusive
The peer set is drawn from robot-sector names for which data can be confirmed, while accounting for the business difference that Clobot centers on autonomous-navigation and fleet-control software rather than hardware manufacturing. The figures below are computed on the site's current price.
| Peer | P/E | P/B | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rainbow Robotics | 5845.84x | 62.11x | 1.06% |
| Doosan Robotics | — | 13.09x | -15.92% |
| Robotis | 589.25x | 9.56x | 1.62% |
Clobot is in a net-loss position, so a P/E cannot be computed and an earnings-based comparison is impossible. Peers Rainbow Robotics, Doosan Robotics, and Robotis also have P/Es in the thousands or are loss-making, showing that the robot sector as a whole is currently priced on future expectations rather than present earnings. On a P/B basis, Clobot's 12.2x is similar to Robotis (10.6x). It is far below Rainbow Robotics (70.3x) and also below Doosan Robotics (15.5x), so it is not extreme within the sector. However, last year's confirmed (trailing) results are a loss, so an earnings-based position cannot be set, and this year's approximation (forward) rests on a seasonality estimate rather than the company's official outlook, so the basis is weak. Before the loss-to-profit inflection and the outcome of the DLS acquisition can be confirmed, it is hard to declare the shares under- or overvalued, so we leave the verdict inconclusive.
Earnings outlook company-stated · verified
| Type | Period | Revenue | Operating profit | Net profit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Next quarter | Q2 2026 | ₩12.9 billion | — | — |
Price history Close · MA20 · MA60
The latest close is ₩25,150 and the market capitalization is ₩640.3 billion. The price sits below its 20-day moving average (₩31,462) and below its 60-day moving average (₩40,758). It is under both its short- and medium-term moving averages, so the trend looks subdued. The RSI (a supplementary indicator that gauges the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 31.6, a neutral level. The one-month change is -25.4%, the three-month change is -38.4%, and the position relative to the 52-week high is -66.8%. Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 70 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market). It is stronger than roughly 71% of all stocks. Over the past three months it lagged the index by 22.2%. Chart interpretation is best done alongside trading volume and the dates on which disclosures occur.
Relative performance stock vs index · start = 100
Excess return vs index · 3M -22.25% / 6M -47.25% / 12M +29.86%
Key metrics vs sector median
Valuation
The P/B of 10.61x is above the sector median (6.92x).
Enterprise value (EV)
EV = market cap + net debt. It reflects cash and debt, so it captures the real cost of the whole business that market cap alone misses; lower multiples are cheaper relative to earnings or sales.
Profitability & financials
The operating margin is -7.7%. The debt ratio is 121.0%, so the financial structure is moderate.
Growth FY2025 · annual report (consolidated)
| Item | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $16.0M | $22.1M | $27.4M | +23.99% ↓ slower |
| Operating profit | -$3.8M | -$5.0M | -$2.1M | — |
| Net profit | -$14.9M | — | — | — |
| 5-year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | — | — | $16.0M | $22.1M | $27.4M |
| Operating profit | — | — | -$3.8M | -$5.0M | -$2.1M |
| Net profit | — | — | -$14.9M | — | — |
| Revenue CAGR | 2-yr avg 30.79% | ||||
Revenue rose 24.0% year over year (2023 ₩24.2 billion → 2024 ₩33.4 billion → 2025 ₩41.4 billion), and the three-year trend is 'rising'. That said, the pace of growth slowed from the prior year. Operating results are in the red, so a swing back to profit matters more than the growth rate here. Over the 3 years on record, revenue compound annual growth (CAGR) is 30.8%. The two-year revenue CAGR is 30.8%. In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), revenue was 65.0% higher than the same period a year earlier.
Latest quarterly results Q1 2026 · vs year-ago
Technical indicators
What stands out
- Revenue grew 24.0% year over year, a sign of growth.
Points to watch
- The price is high versus peers, so expectations already appear priced in.
Recent news & events searched · sourced
- 2026-05-07FilingBoard resolution to submit a binding offer to acquire management control of Doosan Logistics Solution (DLS), aimed at strengthening logistics robots and unified fleet control and securing WMS and WCS capabilities.If successful, medium-term momentum from expanding the business into logistics robots, but it comes with large acquisition funding and integration burdens. Source
- 2026-06-04FilingCorrection to the material-fact report (rights-offering decision). A public offering of forfeited shares after a rights allocation, issuing 5,494,500 common shares. Use of proceeds is roughly ₩37.66 billion of working capital and about ₩162.34 billion for acquiring another company's securities (the DLS purchase).The core means of funding the acquisition, but it comes with dilution of existing shareholders from new-share issuance. Source
- 2026-06-09UpdateSingle sales/supply contract signed (voluntary disclosure). A voluntary disclosure announcing a new supply contract.A new supply contract adds to the revenue base; how the contract size and revenue-recognition timing feed into subsequent results needs to be confirmed. Source
- 2026-06-08UpdateDisclosure of a lawsuit filed (a claim above a set threshold).A contingency that could affect costs or reputation depending on the outcome, so the progress in follow-up disclosures should be watched. Source
- 2026-05-15EarningsQ1 2026 report. Revenue of ₩8.12 billion (+65.0% year on year), operating loss of ₩2.50 billion, net loss of ₩2.21 billion.Revenue growth reaccelerated but the loss persisted, so whether growth converts to profit is the key point to confirm. Source
Figure cross-check computed ↔ external
Recent filings
- 2026-06-09Single supply/sales contract
- 2026-06-08Litigation disclosure
- 2026-06-04Amended filing
- 2026-06-04Material-fact report (amended)
- 2026-05-19Amended filing
- 2026-05-15PeriodicQuarterly report
- 2026-05-11Amended filing
- 2026-05-08OwnershipOwnership-change filing
- 2026-05-07Disclosure
- 2026-05-04Amended filing
- 2026-04-20OwnershipOfficers'/major-shareholders' holdings report
- 2026-04-20OwnershipOfficers'/major-shareholders' holdings report
📖 Plain-language glossary — expand if you are new to this
- P/E
- How many times a year's net profit the price is worth (lower is cheaper relative to earnings). The P/E here is on trailing (last full-year) results; for companies whose earnings swing fast (memory chips and other cyclicals/high-growth), a forward P/E on this year's expected earnings is more accurate.
- P/B
- Price relative to net assets (equity). Around 1x means it trades near book value; below 1x means below book.
- P/S
- Price relative to a year's revenue — useful for growth companies with thin earnings.
- Net debt / EV
- Net debt = interest-bearing debt − cash. Negative means more cash than debt (net cash). EV (enterprise value) = market cap + net debt, closer to what it would cost to buy the whole business.
- EV/EBIT · EV/EBITDA · EV/Sales
- Enterprise value against operating profit (EBIT), EBITDA, or revenue. Unlike P/E these reflect debt and cash; lower is cheaper relative to earnings power or sales.
- FCF / FCF yield
- Free cash flow = operating cash − capex, the cash actually left over. FCF yield = FCF ÷ market cap; higher means more cash generated per unit of market value.
- Intrinsic value (DCF)
- Future free cash flow (or, for some capex-heavy but profitable names, forecast earnings) discounted to today to estimate per-share value. Because it shifts a lot with the discount-rate and growth assumptions, it is shown as a bear/base/bull range, and the basis and assumptions are disclosed in one line beneath it.
- ROE
- How much profit the company earns in a year on its equity (%). Higher means better returns on capital.
- EPS / BPS
- Earnings per share / net assets (book value) per share.
- Operating / net margin
- Profit left from the core business / final profit after tax and interest, per unit of revenue.
- Debt ratio
- Debt relative to equity (%). Higher means more reliance on borrowing (norms vary by sector).
- Current ratio
- Assets convertible to cash within a year against debt due within a year. Above 100% leaves some short-term headroom.
- Interest coverage
- How many times operating profit covers the interest owed. Below 1x means operating profit alone struggles to cover interest.
- Dividend yield / payout ratio
- The year's dividend as a % of today's price / the share of earnings paid out as dividends.
- Revenue CAGR
- Multi-year growth expressed as a single yearly average (compound annual growth rate).
- RSI (short-term signal)
- Whether recent price action is overheated or beaten down. Above 70 is overbought, below 30 oversold.
- MA20 / MA60 (moving averages)
- The 20- and 60-day average price. Price above them signals a firmer short-term trend.
- vs 52-week high
- How far below the past year's peak the price sits now (%).
All figures are for reference only; how they read varies by sector and over time.
Sources: Korea FSC market-price API (data.go.kr), OpenDART, KRX/KIND — public data only.
Bong Stocks presents public-data-based information for reference only. It is not investment advice and contains no target prices, ratings, or buy/sell recommendations. Verify independently before making any decision.