Pino (formerly Skymoons Technology) was originally a telecom-equipment company, but after a Hong Kong affiliate of CNGR, China's largest precursor maker, became the largest shareholder with about 29.9% in 2024, its business shifted; it is now a secondary-battery value-chain company that makes NCM precursor, the intermediate material one step ahead of cathode material for EV batteries, and supplies it to L&F, a leading domestic cathode maker. A swing to profit in Q1 2026 was confirmed and supply contracts with L&F are actually stacking up, with revenue up more than eightfold in a year, but share-count increases via a rights offering and convertible bonds have proceeded alongside. What stands out lately is that, with the share-price pullback, the P/E on this year's earnings has fallen to about 12x, so value appeal can surface as much as earnings normalize; but with revenue leaning heavily on the L&F share, this customer's orders feed straight into results, and it is an early-transition company also exposed to further dilution and trade and regulatory conditions.

At-a-glance assessment financial health · growth · profitability · valuation

Financial healthCaution
  • Operating profit barely covers the interest bill (interest coverage below 1x).
  • The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
GrowthHigh growth
  • Revenue rose 763.1% year over year, and the pace is quickening (3-year trend: rising).
  • Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) revenue was 96.8% higher than a year earlier.
ProfitabilityLoss-making
  • ROE is -5.9% (total-net basis). It is below the sector average.
  • Operating margin is 3.3%.
ValuationOvervalued
  • P/E is hard to compute here, so this is read on P/B.

Ownership & governance As of 2025-12-31

Largest shareholder Zoomwe Hong Kong New Energy Technology Co., Ltd 31.37% (corporate)

Controlling bloc incl. related parties 44.95%

With the controlling bloc holding 45%, the ownership structure is stable.

🔎 In-depth analysis

🏢Business
  • Pino (formerly Skymoons Technology) was originally a company that made RF repeaters and telecom equipment used in mobile base stations.
  • In 2024, when Zoomwe Hong Kong, a Hong Kong affiliate of CNGR, China's largest precursor maker, became the largest shareholder with about 29.9% through a third-party allotment rights offering, the business changed greatly.
  • Most of revenue now comes from 'precursor.' Precursor is the intermediate material at the step before cathode material, a core part of EV batteries, and NCM precursor — a mix of nickel, cobalt, and manganese — is the mainstay.
  • Pino supplies this NCM precursor to L&F, a leading domestic cathode maker, and L&F takes it and makes battery cathode material.
  • In other words, where Pino truly earns its money is not telecom equipment but the secondary-battery value chain, making and supplying the 'material for battery material.'
📈Price & chart
  • The recent close is ₩5,480 and market cap is ₩456.6 billion.
  • The price sits below the 20-day line (₩7,398) and the 60-day line (₩10,749).
  • Trading below both its short- and mid-term moving averages, the trend is on the soft side.
  • The RSI (an indicator that gauges the balance of up- and down-moves over the last 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 26.6, close to depressed territory.
  • The one-month change is -40.2%, the three-month change is -42.6%, and it sits -70.5% from its 52-week high.
  • Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 83 (on a 1-99 scale, weighting recent returns against the index over the past year more heavily; higher means stronger than the market), placing it in roughly the top 16% of all stocks by strength.
  • Over the last three months it lagged the index by 25.2%.
  • Chart reading is best done alongside trading volume and the dates disclosures were filed.
📊Key metrics
  • Because 2025 net profit on confirmed full-year results was a loss, a trailing P/E (a price multiple computed on last year's earnings) cannot be derived.
  • The P/B (how many times the company's net assets the price is) is 4.59x, above the electrical-equipment sector median (2.13x), but against the actual peer group of secondary-battery materials stocks (EcoPro BM at 8.15x P/B, L&F at 6.5x, and so on) it is similar or even lower, so it is hard to call the P/B simply 'high.' More important is that this company is at an earnings inflection.
  • Q1 2026 operating profit (₩9.5 billion) already exceeded full-year 2025 operating profit (₩8.8 billion), and net profit for the same quarter also swung to a ₩8.9 billion profit.
  • So the trailing indicators computed on last year's loss are already stale, and with the recent share-price pullback, the P/E on this year's earnings has fallen to about 12x.
  • Against secondary-battery materials peers (whose P/Es run into the hundreds or cannot be derived due to losses), that is clearly a low seat, a structure in which the valuation burden shrinks quickly as earnings normalize.
  • The debt-to-equity ratio is 166.6%, hard to call heavy, and the current ratio of 215% leaves short-term solvency ample.
  • That said, since last year's interest coverage ratio was below 1x, what remains is to confirm whether this year's profit trend firms up on a full-year basis.
🚀Growth
  • Five-year revenue stagnated and shrank in its telecom-equipment days — ₩11.3 billion (2021), ₩11.4 billion (2022), ₩7.0 billion (2023) — then grew explosively to ₩30.7 billion (2024) and ₩264.8 billion (2025) as the precursor business took off.
  • That is +763.1% in a single year, and operating profit swung from a loss in 2023 to a ₩8.8 billion profit in 2025.
  • In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), cumulative revenue of ₩109.1 billion was +96.8% versus the same period last year, with operating profit of ₩9.5 billion and net profit of ₩8.9 billion — a swing to profit.
  • That Q1 revenue alone topped 40% of last year's annual revenue, and that quarterly operating profit already overtook last year's full-year figure, shows the growth pace directly.
  • The reasons this year's earnings grow this much are clear: precursor orders from L&F, a large cathode customer, are stacking up as actual supply contracts; NCM precursor demand for EV batteries provides support; and through the CNGR affiliate, its largest shareholder, it has advantages in sourcing raw materials such as nickel and cobalt and in production capacity.
  • Unlike its telecom-equipment days, it is now in a phase where revenue and earnings grow together by increasing volume within a proven value chain.
  • There is some seasonality with revenue skewing toward Q4, so quarterly variance can occur, but this is a point to factor in when comparing quarters, not something that negates the annual trend.
📰Recent news & filings
  • The events that shaped the flow run along two lines.
  • The first is core-business results: the April 2026 single supply-contract disclosure shows NCM precursor supply to L&F is stacking up as actual contracts, and the May quarterly report officially confirmed the Q1 swing to profit.
  • The April investor briefing (IR) was a venue to directly explain the progress of the precursor business.
  • The second is changes in capital and governance: as with the April 2026 disclosure of the results of a third-party-allotment rights offering and the June disclosure of exercise of convertible-bond conversion rights, funding needed for business expansion came alongside a rise in share count (dilution).
  • March also brought a change of CEO and the results of the annual general meeting.
  • Taken together, the disclosures paint a company in transition where 'the core business grows fast while the external funding and new share issuance to support that growth also increase.'
🧭Bottom line
  • The strengths are clear.
  • The business has been reshaped around precursor, a core secondary-battery material; it secured a large customer in L&F, with revenue up more than eightfold in a year and a Q1 swing to profit in which quarterly operating profit already exceeded last year's full-year figure.
  • With the recent share-price pullback, the P/E on this year's earnings has fallen to about 12x, a low seat compared with the same secondary-battery materials peers, so value appeal can surface as much as earnings normalize.
  • The points to view alongside are equally clear.
  • With revenue leaning heavily on the L&F share, this customer's utilization and order flow feed straight into results, and because the largest shareholder is China's CNGR affiliate, sourcing raw materials is favorable but exposure to shifts in trade and regulatory conditions remains.
  • Per-share value dilution is also under way as share count rises via the rights offering and convertible bonds.
  • In sum, this company is strong 'when precursor demand and L&F orders continue and quarterly profit firms up on a full-year basis,' and relatively weak 'when a single customer's orders decline or further dilution continues.' As an early-transition company with a history of losses, it is natural to watch, confirming the trend of quarterly profit settling in on a full-year basis.

🔎 Valuation vs peers Inconclusive

The base sector is 'electrical equipment,' but since the actual business is precursor for secondary-battery cathodes, secondary-battery materials stocks in the same value chain were taken as the peer group; L&F is also a key customer of Pino. On-site figures were confirmed with tools/peers.py.

PeerP/EP/BROE
Ecopro BM277.09x6.31x2.28%
POSCO Future M402.54x3.19x0.79%
L&F5.51x-79.27%
Lotte Energy Materials1.05x-9.51%

(a) The actual peer group of secondary-battery materials stocks has P/Bs distributed as EcoPro BM 9.3x, L&F 7.58x, and POSCO Future M 4.04x, and Pino's 5.33x sits in the middle of this range, not far off. (b) However, Pino is early in its business transition, with a history of losses and single-customer dependence lingering, so even at the same P/B the discount factors are larger on stability and earnings quality. (c) The trailing P/E on last year's confirmed results cannot be derived because of the loss, and with the Q1 swing to profit it is at an inflection where earnings change rapidly, so past indicators alone make it hard to declare it cheap or expensive. With no official company forecast figures disclosed, the forward grounds rest only at the level of the seasonality approximation below, so on balance 'inconclusive' is appropriate.

Earnings outlook company-stated · verified

TypePeriodRevenueOperating profitNet profit
Next quarterQ2 2026approx. ₩69.4 billion
₩5,480 +1.11%
Market cap $302.6M

Price history Close · MA20 · MA60

Close MA20MA60

The latest close is ₩5,480 and the market capitalization is ₩456.6 billion. The price sits below its 20-day moving average (₩7,398) and below its 60-day moving average (₩10,749). It is under both its short- and medium-term moving averages, so the trend looks subdued. The RSI (a supplementary indicator that gauges the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 26.6, near oversold territory. The one-month change is -40.2%, the three-month change is -42.6%, and the position relative to the 52-week high is -70.5%. Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 83 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market). It is stronger than roughly 84% of all stocks. Over the past three months it lagged the index by 25.2%. Chart interpretation is best done alongside trading volume and the dates on which disclosures occur.

Relative performance stock vs index · start = 100

83Relative strength vs KOSDAQ1–99 · last 12 months’ return vs the index, recency-weighted · higher = stronger than the marketTop 16% strength

Excess return vs index · 3M -25.16% / 6M +19.10% / 12M +32.58%

StockKOSDAQ

Key metrics vs sector median

Valuation

P/E (trailing)
P/B4.59x
P/S1.72x
EPS₩-71
BPS (book value/share)₩1,194
Dividend yield
DPS

A net loss makes the P/E an unreliable valuation gauge. The P/B of 4.59x is above the sector median (2.15x).

Enterprise value (EV)

Net debt-$32.1M
EV (enterprise value)$358.9M
EV/EBIT61.21x
EV/EBITDA58.99x
EV/Sales2.05x

EV = market cap + net debt. It reflects cash and debt, so it captures the real cost of the whole business that market cap alone misses; lower multiples are cheaper relative to earnings or sales.

Profitability & financials

ROE-5.95%
Operating margin3.34%
Net margin-2.21%
Debt ratio166.55%
Payout ratio

Return on equity (ROE) is -5.9%, below the sector average (2.0%). The operating margin is 3.3%. The debt ratio is 166.6%, so the financial structure is moderate.

Growth FY2025 · annual report (separate)

Item202320242025YoY
Revenue$4.6M$20.3M$175.5M+763.08% ↑ faster
Operating profit-$1.4M$5,042$5.9M+116185.79%
Net profit-$1.3M-$1.6M-$3.9M
5-year20212022202320242025
Revenue$7.5M$7.6M$4.6M$20.3M$175.5M
Operating profit$1.3M$969,421-$1.4M$5,042$5.9M
Net profit$1.5M$1.1M-$1.3M-$1.6M-$3.9M
Revenue CAGR4-yr avg 120.23%

Revenue rose 763.1% year over year (2023 ₩7.0 billion → 2024 ₩30.7 billion → 2025 ₩264.8 billion), and the three-year trend is 'rising'. The pace of growth also quickened from the prior year. Operating profit rose 116185.8% year over year. Over the 5 years on record, revenue compound annual growth (CAGR) is 120.2%. The two-year revenue CAGR is 516.5%. In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), revenue was 96.8% higher than the same period a year earlier.

Latest quarterly results Q1 2026 · vs year-ago

Revenue$72.3M
Revenue YoY+96.82%
Operating profit$6.3M
Op. profit YoY+17620.84%
Net profit$5.9M
Net profit YoY

Technical indicators

RSI (14)26.6
MA20₩7,398
MA60₩10,749
1-month-40.17%
3-month-42.62%
vs 52-wk high-70.46%

What stands out

  • Revenue grew 763.1% year over year, a sign of growth.

Points to watch

  • Operating profit barely covers the interest bill (interest coverage below 1x).
  • The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
  • The most recent full year was a loss, so it is worth checking whether profitability recovers.
  • The price is high versus peers, so expectations already appear priced in.

Recent news & events searched · sourced

Figure cross-check computed ↔ external

MetricComputedExternalStatusSource
Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) cumulative operating profit₩9.5 billion(approx. ₩9.5 billion)(2026.03) DARTConfirmedlink
2025 annual revenue₩264.8 billion(2025.12) DARTConfirmedlink
Largest shareholder (governance)CNGR Zoomwe Hong Kong approx. 29.9%DARTConfirmedlink
Latest closing price₩5,480Unverifiedlink
Seasonality-approximated annual revenueapprox. ₩551.4 billionUnverifiedlink

Recent filings

📖 Plain-language glossary — expand if you are new to this
P/E
How many times a year's net profit the price is worth (lower is cheaper relative to earnings). The P/E here is on trailing (last full-year) results; for companies whose earnings swing fast (memory chips and other cyclicals/high-growth), a forward P/E on this year's expected earnings is more accurate.
P/B
Price relative to net assets (equity). Around 1x means it trades near book value; below 1x means below book.
P/S
Price relative to a year's revenue — useful for growth companies with thin earnings.
Net debt / EV
Net debt = interest-bearing debt − cash. Negative means more cash than debt (net cash). EV (enterprise value) = market cap + net debt, closer to what it would cost to buy the whole business.
EV/EBIT · EV/EBITDA · EV/Sales
Enterprise value against operating profit (EBIT), EBITDA, or revenue. Unlike P/E these reflect debt and cash; lower is cheaper relative to earnings power or sales.
FCF / FCF yield
Free cash flow = operating cash − capex, the cash actually left over. FCF yield = FCF ÷ market cap; higher means more cash generated per unit of market value.
Intrinsic value (DCF)
Future free cash flow (or, for some capex-heavy but profitable names, forecast earnings) discounted to today to estimate per-share value. Because it shifts a lot with the discount-rate and growth assumptions, it is shown as a bear/base/bull range, and the basis and assumptions are disclosed in one line beneath it.
ROE
How much profit the company earns in a year on its equity (%). Higher means better returns on capital.
EPS / BPS
Earnings per share / net assets (book value) per share.
Operating / net margin
Profit left from the core business / final profit after tax and interest, per unit of revenue.
Debt ratio
Debt relative to equity (%). Higher means more reliance on borrowing (norms vary by sector).
Current ratio
Assets convertible to cash within a year against debt due within a year. Above 100% leaves some short-term headroom.
Interest coverage
How many times operating profit covers the interest owed. Below 1x means operating profit alone struggles to cover interest.
Dividend yield / payout ratio
The year's dividend as a % of today's price / the share of earnings paid out as dividends.
Revenue CAGR
Multi-year growth expressed as a single yearly average (compound annual growth rate).
RSI (short-term signal)
Whether recent price action is overheated or beaten down. Above 70 is overbought, below 30 oversold.
MA20 / MA60 (moving averages)
The 20- and 60-day average price. Price above them signals a firmer short-term trend.
vs 52-week high
How far below the past year's peak the price sits now (%).

All figures are for reference only; how they read varies by sector and over time.

Sources: Korea FSC market-price API (data.go.kr), OpenDART, KRX/KIND — public data only.

Bong Stocks presents public-data-based information for reference only. It is not investment advice and contains no target prices, ratings, or buy/sell recommendations. Verify independently before making any decision.