JS Link is a company in transition, split between a bio division that has historically earned its money from genome analysis and genetic testing, and a permanent-magnet division launched in August 2024 that makes rare-earth neodymium magnets for EV motors, robots and wind turbines. Most of its revenue still comes from the bio side, while the magnet business is in the plant-building preparatory stage. At its domestic Yesan plant the company successfully trial-produced non-Chinese neodymium magnets and confirmed top-grade N52 performance; it is targeting a year-end 2027 start-up for a 3,000-tonne-per-year plant in Georgia, USA, and has committed ₩50 billion to a Malaysian subsidiary, funding this expansion of production bases through convertible bonds. What stands out lately is that the strengths of attempting non-Chinese magnet production and successful N52-grade trial output sit alongside cautions: magnet revenue is not yet in full swing, losses have grown every year, there is share-supply overhang from the convertible bonds, and a P/B of 18x and P/S of 65x already price in expectations of future mass production.
At-a-glance assessment financial health · growth · profitability · valuation
- The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
- Revenue rose 21.4% year over year, and the pace is quickening (3-year trend: mixed).
- Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) revenue was 69.4% higher than a year earlier.
- ROE is -24.0% (controlling-interest basis). It is above the sector average.
- Operating margin is -64.6%.
- P/E is hard to compute here, so this is read on P/B.
Ownership & governance As of 2025-12-31
Largest shareholder Jusung C&Air 17.61% (individual)
Controlling bloc incl. related parties 28.02%
With the controlling bloc holding 28%, control is maintained but the free float is relatively large.
🔎 In-depth analysis
- The company is split into two divisions.
- Its original roots lie in the bio division, which has earned its money from genetic services such as genome analysis (NGS and DNA microarrays), genetic testing, biobanking and forensic personal identification.
- From August 2024 it opened a new permanent-magnet division, a business that makes rare-earth permanent magnets (NdFeB, neodymium magnets) used in EV motors, robots and wind power.
- Most of its revenue still comes from the existing bio side, while the magnet operation is in the preparatory stage of building plants and making prototypes.
- In other words, this is a company in transition where the business that earns and the business it is growing are different.
- The recent close is ₩37,350 and market capitalization is ₩1.3 trillion.
- The price sits above its 20-day line (₩35,628) but below its 60-day line (₩38,783), so short-term and medium-term trends are diverging and should be read separately.
- The RSI (a supplementary gauge that compares up-day and down-day strength over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 52.7, a neutral level.
- The one-month change is +20.9%, the three-month change is -6.7%, and the position versus the 52-week high is -23.6%.
- Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 95 (1-99, computed from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market), placing it in roughly the top 4% for strength among all stocks.
- Over the past three months it outpaced the index by 30.3%.
- Chart reading is best done alongside volume and disclosure dates.
- Read purely by the numbers, this is heavy.
- The P/E ratio (how many times a year's earnings the share price is) cannot be calculated because the company is in the red.
- The P/B (how many times the company's net assets the price is) is 18.85x, very high.
- The P/S (how many times a year's revenue the price is) is an extreme 65x, because revenue is about ₩19.3 billion while market cap is ₩1.26 trillion.
- ROE (how much is earned in a year on equity) is -24.0% and the operating margin is -64.6%, so the company is not yet profitable.
- The debt ratio (debt against equity) is about 179%.
- That said, net debt (total borrowings minus cash) is negative, meaning a net-cash position where cash on hand slightly exceeds borrowings.
- The FCF yield (cash actually generated relative to market cap) is -4.3%, as cash is flowing out for plant investment.
- These metrics show a company that is spending for the future rather than one that is currently earning well, which makes it hard to value on current earnings or asset multiples alone.
- Revenue rose 21.4% year on year in 2025, and Q1 2026 revenue was up 69.4% from a year earlier.
- The direction is up.
- But earnings run the opposite way.
- Net losses widened every year: -₩5.1 billion in 2021, -₩5.6 billion in 2023, -₩10.8 billion in 2024 and -₩16.4 billion in 2025.
- In Q1 2026 it posted an operating loss of -₩4.9 billion and a net loss of -₩3.8 billion.
- This reflects a structure where costs come first, as the company builds its magnet plant and runs trial production.
- The real picture of growth hinges on magnet mass production.
- The domestic Yesan plant (1,000 tonnes per year) succeeded in trial production in 2025, and the Georgia plant in the USA (3,000 tonnes per year) targets a year-end 2027 start-up.
- In other words, the point at which magnet revenue is meaningfully reflected in results is still ahead.
- Until then, it is honest to treat this as a loss-making period.
- Recent developments all converge on preparation to grow the magnet business.
- The company succeeded in trial-producing non-Chinese neodymium magnets at its domestic Yesan plant and confirmed top-grade N52 performance.
- In Columbus, Georgia, USA, it plans a plant of 3,000 tonnes per year, targeting a year-end 2027 start-up.
- In Malaysia it set up a wholly owned subsidiary (JS LINK MAGNETICS MALAYSIA) and decided to inject ₩50 billion.
- To fund this investment it also issued convertible bonds several times.
- In May 2026 it disclosed a single sales and supply contract.
- Positive signals and burdens sit together: production bases and the supply chain are being built out quickly, but so too grows the burden of funding and the share-supply overhang from convertible bonds.
- This is a stock valued not on current results but on future execution.
- The strengths are clear.
- It is an attempt to make non-Chinese magnets at a time when China is tightening rare-earth exports, and it is expanding production bases across Korea, the USA and Malaysia.
- Successful N52-grade trial production is evidence that the technology is more than talk.
- The cautions are equally clear.
- Magnet revenue is not yet in full swing, losses have widened every year, and covering large-scale investment with convertible bonds creates future share-supply overhang.
- A P/B of 18x and P/S of 65x are not explained by current figures; they reflect expectations of future mass production priced in early.
- In short, the structure grows strong if magnet mass production reaches its planned trajectory, and weaker if the schedule slips or funding pressure mounts.
🔎 Valuation vs peers Inconclusive
Compared against domestic listed makers of permanent magnets and magnet materials, though earnings-based multiple comparison is limited because JS Link is still ahead of magnet mass production.
| Peer | P/E | P/B | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|
| Novatech | 6.58x | 0.73x | 11.15% |
On current metrics alone, the P/B of 18.3x and P/S of 65x are very high. With no earnings the P/E cannot be calculated, and EV/Sales (enterprise value divided by revenue) is also an extreme 65x or so. But these figures reflect expectations for future magnet capacity to be built rather than current earnings, so calling it overvalued outright is difficult. For reference, an already-profitable magnet and materials maker (Novatech) trades at around a P/B of 0.8x and a P/E of 7x. This gap shows that JS Link is valued on expectations of future mass production rather than on proven earnings. The honest conclusion, therefore, is neither undervalued nor overvalued but inconclusive. If magnet mass production converts into revenue and earnings as planned, today's multiples could be justified; if the schedule slips, the burden grows. The key to the judgment is not the multiple itself but the actual start-up of the Yesan and Georgia plants and their order intake.
Price history Close · MA20 · MA60
The latest close is ₩37,350 and the market capitalization is ₩1.3 trillion. The price sits above its 20-day moving average (₩35,628) and below its 60-day moving average (₩38,783). Short-term and medium-term trends are diverging, so the direction is best read separately. The RSI (a supplementary indicator that gauges the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 52.7, a neutral level. The one-month change is +20.9%, the three-month change is -6.7%, and the position relative to the 52-week high is -23.6%. Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 95 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market). It is stronger than roughly 96% of all stocks. Over the past three months it outpaced the index by 30.3%. Chart interpretation is best done alongside trading volume and the dates on which disclosures occur.
Relative performance stock vs index · start = 100
Excess return vs index · 3M +30.28% / 6M +168.63% / 12M +235.30%
Key metrics vs sector median
Valuation
A net loss makes the P/E an unreliable valuation gauge. The P/B of 18.85x is above the sector median (7.05x).
Enterprise value (EV)
EV = market cap + net debt. It reflects cash and debt, so it captures the real cost of the whole business that market cap alone misses; lower multiples are cheaper relative to earnings or sales.
Profitability & financials
The operating margin is -64.6%. The debt ratio is 179.4%, so the financial structure is moderate.
Growth FY2025 · annual report (consolidated)
| Item | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $14.5M | $10.5M | $12.8M | +21.43% ↑ faster |
| Operating profit | -$2.9M | -$6.0M | -$8.3M | — |
| Net profit | -$3.7M | -$7.2M | -$10.9M | — |
| 5-year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $15.2M | $11.3M | $14.5M | $10.5M | $12.8M |
| Operating profit | -$3.4M | -$3.4M | -$2.9M | -$6.0M | -$8.3M |
| Net profit | -$3.4M | -$5.2M | -$3.7M | -$7.2M | -$10.9M |
| Revenue CAGR | 4-yr avg -4.26% | ||||
Revenue rose 21.4% year over year (2023 ₩21.9 billion → 2024 ₩15.9 billion → 2025 ₩19.3 billion), and the three-year trend is 'mixed'. The pace of growth also quickened from the prior year. Operating results are in the red, so a swing back to profit matters more than the growth rate here. Over the 5 years on record, revenue compound annual growth (CAGR) is -4.3%. The two-year revenue CAGR is -6.2%. In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), revenue was 69.4% higher than the same period a year earlier.
Latest quarterly results Q1 2026 · vs year-ago
Technical indicators
What stands out
- Revenue grew 21.4% year over year, a sign of growth.
Points to watch
- The most recent full year was a loss, so it is worth checking whether profitability recovers.
- The price is high versus peers, so expectations already appear priced in.
Recent news & events searched · sourced
- 2025-10-02IRSucceeded in trial production of non-Chinese NdFeB (neodymium) permanent magnets at the Yesan plant in South Chungcheong (a line of 1,000 tonnes per year).A signal that the magnet business has moved from the planning stage to actual production. It lays the groundwork for mass production and orders over the medium term. Source
- 2026-03-24IRConfirmed that the permanent magnets produced meet top-grade N52 performance.Evidence that product quality has reached a top grade, raising the potential to serve high-performance motor customers; a medium-term positive. Source
- 2025-09-04IRAnnounced construction of a rare-earth permanent-magnet plant of 3,000 tonnes per year in Columbus, Georgia, USA (targeting year-end 2027 start-up).Securing a North American production base gives concrete form to a non-China supply-chain strategy. However, the revenue contribution is timed after late 2027. Source
- 2026-05-07FilingDecided to establish a wholly owned subsidiary in Malaysia (JS LINK MAGNETICS MALAYSIA) and inject ₩50 billion (about 50% of shareholders' equity).A medium-term expansion widening the materials and production supply chain overseas. On the other hand, at half of shareholders' equity, this large investment also increases financial pressure and funding needs. Source
- 2026-05-13UpdateDisclosed the conclusion of a single sales and supply contract (a material-fact disclosure).A short-term positive signal that a supply contract has actually occurred. Whether the contract translates into magnet revenue needs to be confirmed in subsequent results. Source
- 2026-05-13UpdateDecided to issue convertible bonds (material-fact report), for the purpose of funding investment such as magnet production facilities.The positive side of securing funds for plant investment coexists with the negative side of share-supply overhang when the bonds later convert into stock. Source
Figure cross-check computed ↔ external
Recent filings
- 2026-05-15PeriodicQuarterly report
- 2026-05-13Single supply/sales contract
- 2026-05-13Material-fact report
- 2026-05-13Material-fact report
- 2026-05-07Amended filing
- 2026-04-22OwnershipOfficers'/major-shareholders' holdings report
- 2026-04-06OwnershipOwnership-change filing
- 2026-04-06OwnershipOfficers'/major-shareholders' holdings report
- 2026-03-31Disclosure
- 2026-03-31Amended filing
- 2026-03-31Disclosure
- 2026-03-31Shareholders' meeting notice
📖 Plain-language glossary — expand if you are new to this
- P/E
- How many times a year's net profit the price is worth (lower is cheaper relative to earnings). The P/E here is on trailing (last full-year) results; for companies whose earnings swing fast (memory chips and other cyclicals/high-growth), a forward P/E on this year's expected earnings is more accurate.
- P/B
- Price relative to net assets (equity). Around 1x means it trades near book value; below 1x means below book.
- P/S
- Price relative to a year's revenue — useful for growth companies with thin earnings.
- Net debt / EV
- Net debt = interest-bearing debt − cash. Negative means more cash than debt (net cash). EV (enterprise value) = market cap + net debt, closer to what it would cost to buy the whole business.
- EV/EBIT · EV/EBITDA · EV/Sales
- Enterprise value against operating profit (EBIT), EBITDA, or revenue. Unlike P/E these reflect debt and cash; lower is cheaper relative to earnings power or sales.
- FCF / FCF yield
- Free cash flow = operating cash − capex, the cash actually left over. FCF yield = FCF ÷ market cap; higher means more cash generated per unit of market value.
- Intrinsic value (DCF)
- Future free cash flow (or, for some capex-heavy but profitable names, forecast earnings) discounted to today to estimate per-share value. Because it shifts a lot with the discount-rate and growth assumptions, it is shown as a bear/base/bull range, and the basis and assumptions are disclosed in one line beneath it.
- ROE
- How much profit the company earns in a year on its equity (%). Higher means better returns on capital.
- EPS / BPS
- Earnings per share / net assets (book value) per share.
- Operating / net margin
- Profit left from the core business / final profit after tax and interest, per unit of revenue.
- Debt ratio
- Debt relative to equity (%). Higher means more reliance on borrowing (norms vary by sector).
- Current ratio
- Assets convertible to cash within a year against debt due within a year. Above 100% leaves some short-term headroom.
- Interest coverage
- How many times operating profit covers the interest owed. Below 1x means operating profit alone struggles to cover interest.
- Dividend yield / payout ratio
- The year's dividend as a % of today's price / the share of earnings paid out as dividends.
- Revenue CAGR
- Multi-year growth expressed as a single yearly average (compound annual growth rate).
- RSI (short-term signal)
- Whether recent price action is overheated or beaten down. Above 70 is overbought, below 30 oversold.
- MA20 / MA60 (moving averages)
- The 20- and 60-day average price. Price above them signals a firmer short-term trend.
- vs 52-week high
- How far below the past year's peak the price sits now (%).
All figures are for reference only; how they read varies by sector and over time.
Sources: Korea FSC market-price API (data.go.kr), OpenDART, KRX/KIND — public data only.
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