UTI is a company that grinds and processes glass (tempered glass) to make the 'camera window cover glass' that covers smartphone camera lenses; it entered Samsung Electronics' first-tier supplier ranks with the Galaxy Note 5 in 2015, and almost all of its revenue is exports (₩19.9 billion in 2025). It has drawn $25 million from Corning and is building a new plant in Vietnam to prepare 2026 mass production of flexible glass for foldable phones. The past year has centered on convertible bonds: in May 2026 the early-redemption date arrived for its largest first-series convertible bond (₩54.15 billion), but unable to repay it at once the company agreed to split the redemption into three dates with 15% annual accrued interest, then covered it with the proceeds of a newly issued sixth-series bond. What stands out now is that, alongside its first-tier Samsung supplier status, the Corning tie-up, and a foldable-glass mass-production growth story, an asset-based undervaluation with the P/B down to 1.12x is a strength; against that, as long as capacity utilization stays around 20% the loss continues, and a debt ratio of 327.5% together with repeated convertible bonds and early redemptions raises dilution and liquidity-strain burdens, so whether mass production actually books as revenue and lifts utilization is what sets the direction.
At-a-glance assessment financial health · growth · profitability · valuation
- Debt far exceeds equity (debt ratio 327.5%).
- Assets that can be turned to cash within a year fall short of near-term liabilities (current ratio 55.3%).
- The most recent full-year net result was a loss.
- Revenue rose 7.6% year over year, and the pace is quickening (3-year trend: mixed).
- Most recent quarter (Q1 2026) revenue was 1.4% higher than a year earlier.
- ROE is -57.1% (controlling-interest basis). It is below the sector average.
- Operating margin is -241.9%.
- P/E is hard to compute here, so this is read on P/B.
Ownership & governance As of 2025-12-31
Largest shareholder Park Deok-young 16.62% (individual)
Controlling bloc incl. related parties 23.73%
With the controlling bloc holding 24%, control is maintained but the free float is relatively large.
🔎 In-depth analysis
- UTI earns revenue by grinding and processing glass (tempered glass).
- Its main product is the 'camera window cover glass' that covers smartphone camera lenses; it entered Samsung Electronics' first-tier supplier ranks with the Galaxy Note 5 in 2015 and has supplied a cumulative total of more than 1.2 billion units.
- Almost all of its revenue is exports (₩19.9 billion of ₩19.9 billion in 2025), and it is effectively tied into Samsung's supply chain.
- By product, 2025 revenue was ₩13.0 billion for camera windows (64.9%), ₩4.4 billion for slimming (22.2%, receiving Corning glass and grinding it thin to supply Samsung), and ₩2.6 billion for other (12.9%, including flexible-glass samples), so a structure once concentrated in a single business - camera windows made up 97.4% in 2023 - is diversifying.
- Flexible glass for foldable phones has finished development and is preparing for 2026 mass production; for this the company drew $25 million from Corning (currently a shareholder with an 8.4% stake) and is building a new plant in Binh Phuc, Vietnam.
- The latest close is ₩3,910 and market capitalization is ₩77.4 billion.
- The price sits below both the 20-day line (₩7,792) and the 60-day line (₩16,045).
- Trading beneath both its short- and medium-term moving averages, the trend is on the subdued side.
- The RSI (a supplementary gauge that weighs upward against downward force over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 22.3, near oversold territory.
- The price is down 76.9% over one month and 77.8% over three months, and stands 86.2% below its 52-week high.
- Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 1 (1-99, converting return against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market), placing it in roughly the bottom 1% of all stocks by strength.
- Over the past three months it lagged the index by 70.8%.
- Chart reading is best done alongside volume and disclosure dates.
- On a confirmed annual (2025) basis, the P/E ratio (how many times a year's profit the price represents) cannot be computed because of the loss.
- The P/B (how many times net assets the price represents) is 1.18x, meaning the price has come down to nearly the same level as the company's book net assets (about ₩3,300 per share).
- In other words, at the current price the stock is hard to call expensive against asset value; if anything it has come near its assets.
- Profitability, however, is clearly weak.
- ROE (how much is earned in a year on equity) is -57.1% and the operating margin is -241.9%, a large loss, and the core cause is low utilization - camera-window utilization was just 18.8% in 2025 (20.7% in 2024, 16.5% in 2023), so with the plant expanded but volumes unfilled, fixed costs book straight through as losses.
- There is also a financial burden: the debt ratio (borrowings against equity) is 327.5% and the current ratio is 55.3%, so debt due within a year exceeds assets convertible to cash right away.
- In sum, it has grown cheap against assets, but weaknesses of loss and debt come with it, so utilization rising and the P&L turning need to be watched together.
- Revenue fell by more than half over five years, from ₩45.2 billion (2021) to ₩20.0 billion (2025) (a five-year average of -18.5%).
- Still, the bottom was 2024 (₩18.6 billion), and 2025 turned back up to ₩20.0 billion (+7.6%); this was less a recovery in camera windows themselves than the result of slimming and other new businesses filling the gap (camera windows alone fell to ₩13.0 billion in 2025 from ₩15.7 billion the year before).
- Operating profit/loss widened from -₩2.2 billion in 2021 to -₩48.3 billion in 2025, and Q1 2026 revenue of ₩4.8 billion (+1.4%) was essentially flat, with an operating loss of -₩13.2 billion.
- The road ahead comes down to two things: whether flexible glass for foldables actually reaches mass production in 2026 and books as revenue, and whether utilization rises enough to shrink the loss.
- The Corning tie-up and the new Vietnam plant are preparation in that direction, and the fact that new businesses are quickly growing their share of revenue is a positive change.
- The company has offered no official profit outlook for this year, so profit recovery is accurately watched by confirming quarter by quarter whether utilization and new-product revenue actually rise.
- The past year is hard to explain without convertible bonds.
- In 2024-2025 the company issued bonds across series one through five (series one ₩54.15 billion, series five ₩52.0 billion, and others), and a considerable portion of these was converted into shares, increasing the share count (about 715,000 new shares issued in 2025 alone).
- May 2026 brought a key event: the early-redemption date arrived for the largest, first-series convertible bond (₩54.15 billion) - the right by which investors demand their principal back - but unable to repay at once, the company agreed with bondholders to split the redemption into three dates (5/22, 5/29, 6/5) and to pay 15% annual accrued interest.
- It then covered this redemption with the proceeds of a newly issued sixth-series convertible bond.
- This is a signal of a phase of repaying debt with debt while cash is tight, so the rise in share count (dilution) and cash flow have to be watched together.
- This is a stock where strengths and weaknesses split sharply.
- (Strengths) It has the stable supply position of a first-tier Samsung Electronics supplier, a strategic tie-up and equity participation with Corning, and a growth story in 2026 mass production of flexible glass for foldables, and with the price having fallen sharply the P/B has come down to 1.12x, so the price has come near net assets - a cheap zone against assets.
- (Cautions) On the other side, as long as utilization stays around 20% the loss continues, and a 327.5% debt ratio together with repeated convertible bonds and early redemptions raises dilution and liquidity-strain burdens, while the sharp short-term drop itself can be seen as that unease being priced in.
- So 'whether foldable-glass mass production actually books as revenue and profit and lifts utilization' is the condition for strengthening, and 'whether mass production is delayed or the bond-redemption burden continues with utilization low' is the condition for weakening.
- Rather than concluding one way or the other, it is a stock to watch through quarterly results and disclosures, viewing the opportunity from how cheap it has become alongside the risks of loss and finances.
🔎 Valuation vs peers Overvalued
The peer group was built from stocks whose business substance is 'foldable / cover glass components within the Samsung supply chain,' placing UTI's position alongside another loss-making cover-glass maker (JNTC), a foldable-materials maker (Fine M-Tec), and a profitable foldable-component maker (KH Vatec).
| Peer | P/E | P/B | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|
| JNTC | — | 3.63x | -36.97% |
| Fine M-Tec | — | 1.26x | -7.63% |
| KH Vatec | 11.00x | 0.81x | 7.37% |
Because of the loss, comparison via P/E is impossible, so P/B and ROE are used. UTI's P/B of 5.36x is higher even than that of the same loss-making cover-glass maker JNTC (3.83x), and stands more than fivefold apart from the profitable foldable-component maker KH Vatec (0.97x). Its ROE of -57.1% is the lowest in the peer group while its P/B is the highest, a structure in which a premium rests not on current profit but on the future expectation of foldable mass production. Last year's confirmed (trailing) metrics are of limited meaning because of the loss, and on a forward basis there is no official company outlook, so only a DART seasonality approximation of revenue (about ₩18.3 billion) can be referenced while profit cannot be estimated. Rather than concluding 'cheap' or 'expensive,' it is more appropriate to view this as a zone where expectations are already priced in and to confirm whether mass-production results fill those expectations.
Earnings outlook company-stated · verified
| Type | Period | Revenue | Operating profit | Net profit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Next quarter | Q2 2026 | approx. ₩4.2 billion | — | — |
Price history Close · MA20 · MA60
The latest close is ₩3,910 and the market capitalization is ₩77.4 billion. The price sits below its 20-day moving average (₩7,792) and below its 60-day moving average (₩16,045). It is under both its short- and medium-term moving averages, so the trend looks subdued. The RSI (a supplementary indicator that gauges the strength of gains versus losses over the past 14 days on a 0-100 scale) is 22.3, near oversold territory. The one-month change is -76.9%, the three-month change is -77.8%, and the position relative to the 52-week high is -86.2%. Relative strength versus the KOSDAQ is 1 (on a 1-99 scale, converted from returns against the index over the past year with more weight on recent performance; higher means stronger than the market). It is stronger than roughly 1% of all stocks. Over the past three months it lagged the index by 70.8%. Chart interpretation is best done alongside trading volume and the dates on which disclosures occur.
Relative performance stock vs index · start = 100
Excess return vs index · 3M -70.80% / 6M -79.97% / 12M -84.12%
Key metrics vs sector median
Valuation
A net loss makes the P/E an unreliable valuation gauge. The P/B of 1.18x is below the sector median (1.63x).
Enterprise value (EV)
EV = market cap + net debt. It reflects cash and debt, so it captures the real cost of the whole business that market cap alone misses; lower multiples are cheaper relative to earnings or sales.
Profitability & financials
Return on equity (ROE) is -57.1%, below the sector average (7.0%). The operating margin is -241.9%. The debt ratio is 327.5%, so the financial structure is somewhat high.
Growth FY2025 · annual report (consolidated)
| Item | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $12.8M | $12.3M | $13.2M | +7.61% ↑ faster |
| Operating profit | -$13.1M | -$21.4M | -$32.0M | — |
| Net profit | -$19.6M | -$15.1M | -$24.8M | — |
| 5-year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $30.0M | $24.2M | $12.8M | $12.3M | $13.2M |
| Operating profit | -$1.5M | -$3.1M | -$13.1M | -$21.4M | -$32.0M |
| Net profit | $851,008 | -$8.0M | -$19.6M | -$15.1M | -$24.8M |
| Revenue CAGR | 4-yr avg -18.47% | ||||
Revenue rose 7.6% year over year (2023 ₩19.4 billion → 2024 ₩18.6 billion → 2025 ₩20.0 billion), and the three-year trend is 'mixed'. The pace of growth also quickened from the prior year. Operating results are in the red, so a swing back to profit matters more than the growth rate here. Over the 5 years on record, revenue compound annual growth (CAGR) is -18.5%. The two-year revenue CAGR is 1.6%. In the most recent quarter (Q1 2026), revenue was 1.4% higher than the same period a year earlier.
Latest quarterly results Q1 2026 · vs year-ago
Technical indicators
What stands out
- P/E and P/B are both low versus peers, so the price looks inexpensive relative to earnings and assets.
Points to watch
- Debt far exceeds equity (debt ratio 327.5%).
- Assets that can be turned to cash within a year fall short of near-term liabilities (current ratio 55.3%).
- The most recent full year was a loss, so it is worth checking whether profitability recovers.
Recent news & events searched · sourced
- 2026-05-26UpdateEarly-redemption date arrived for the first-series convertible bond (₩54.15 billion); by agreement with bondholders the redemption was split into three dates (5/22, 5/29, 6/5) with 15% annual accrued interest paid. The proceeds of the next convertible bond were specified as the top-priority source of redemption funds.In the short term, a signal that reveals a liquidity strain and a refinancing (repaying debt with debt) burden. In the medium term, the possibility of additional dilution from new bond issuance must also be watched. Source
- 2026-05-29FilingVoluntary disclosure of the results of the sixth-series private convertible bond issuance. Used as the source of funds to redeem the immediately preceding first-series CB.It clears the short-term redemption burden, but on conversion the share count rises and existing shareholders' stakes may be diluted. Source
- 2026-03-23Earnings2025 business report filed. Revenue ₩20.0 billion (+7.6%), operating loss -₩48.3 billion, utilization 18.8%. Product mix diversified to camera windows 64.9%, slimming 22.2%, other 12.9%.Confirms a transition phase in which new businesses (slimming, flexible) prop up revenue. The core caution, however, is that low utilization keeps the loss going. Source
- 2026-05-15EarningsQ1 2026 quarterly report filed. Revenue ₩4.8 billion (+1.4%), operating loss -₩13.2 billion.Revenue flat, loss ongoing. Need to confirm the point at which foldable-glass mass production feeds into quarterly results. Source
Figure cross-check computed ↔ external
Recent filings
- 2026-06-01Convertible-bond issuance
- 2026-06-01Material-fact report (amended)
- 2026-05-29Disclosure
- 2026-05-29Convertible-bond issuance
- 2026-05-28OwnershipAmended filing
- 2026-05-28OwnershipOwnership-change filing
- 2026-05-26Material-fact report (amended)
- 2026-05-22Convertible-bond issuance
- 2026-05-21Material-fact report
- 2026-05-20Disclosure
- 2026-05-15PeriodicQuarterly report
- 2026-05-11Amended filing
📖 Plain-language glossary — expand if you are new to this
- P/E
- How many times a year's net profit the price is worth (lower is cheaper relative to earnings). The P/E here is on trailing (last full-year) results; for companies whose earnings swing fast (memory chips and other cyclicals/high-growth), a forward P/E on this year's expected earnings is more accurate.
- P/B
- Price relative to net assets (equity). Around 1x means it trades near book value; below 1x means below book.
- P/S
- Price relative to a year's revenue — useful for growth companies with thin earnings.
- Net debt / EV
- Net debt = interest-bearing debt − cash. Negative means more cash than debt (net cash). EV (enterprise value) = market cap + net debt, closer to what it would cost to buy the whole business.
- EV/EBIT · EV/EBITDA · EV/Sales
- Enterprise value against operating profit (EBIT), EBITDA, or revenue. Unlike P/E these reflect debt and cash; lower is cheaper relative to earnings power or sales.
- FCF / FCF yield
- Free cash flow = operating cash − capex, the cash actually left over. FCF yield = FCF ÷ market cap; higher means more cash generated per unit of market value.
- Intrinsic value (DCF)
- Future free cash flow (or, for some capex-heavy but profitable names, forecast earnings) discounted to today to estimate per-share value. Because it shifts a lot with the discount-rate and growth assumptions, it is shown as a bear/base/bull range, and the basis and assumptions are disclosed in one line beneath it.
- ROE
- How much profit the company earns in a year on its equity (%). Higher means better returns on capital.
- EPS / BPS
- Earnings per share / net assets (book value) per share.
- Operating / net margin
- Profit left from the core business / final profit after tax and interest, per unit of revenue.
- Debt ratio
- Debt relative to equity (%). Higher means more reliance on borrowing (norms vary by sector).
- Current ratio
- Assets convertible to cash within a year against debt due within a year. Above 100% leaves some short-term headroom.
- Interest coverage
- How many times operating profit covers the interest owed. Below 1x means operating profit alone struggles to cover interest.
- Dividend yield / payout ratio
- The year's dividend as a % of today's price / the share of earnings paid out as dividends.
- Revenue CAGR
- Multi-year growth expressed as a single yearly average (compound annual growth rate).
- RSI (short-term signal)
- Whether recent price action is overheated or beaten down. Above 70 is overbought, below 30 oversold.
- MA20 / MA60 (moving averages)
- The 20- and 60-day average price. Price above them signals a firmer short-term trend.
- vs 52-week high
- How far below the past year's peak the price sits now (%).
All figures are for reference only; how they read varies by sector and over time.
Sources: Korea FSC market-price API (data.go.kr), OpenDART, KRX/KIND — public data only.
Bong Stocks presents public-data-based information for reference only. It is not investment advice and contains no target prices, ratings, or buy/sell recommendations. Verify independently before making any decision.